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Are There Any Adjudicated Streams in
Montana?
By ALBERT W. STONE*
One day during the last two weeks of May, 1935, Charles Reeder, a
rancher on Red Rock River in Beaverhead County, Montana, opened the
headgate supplying his ranch with water. In so doing he was clearly in
violation of the ruling of court-appointed water commissioner Charles E.
Calvert, and of the court order issued by District Judge Lyman H. Bennett.
Thereupon Mr. Reeder was convicted of contempt of court and fined. His
neighbors, feeling secure at last from further trouble from Mr. Reeder,
settled down to normal operations. But Mr. Reeder appealed his conviction
to the Supreme Court and secured a reversal.'
All of this trouble had lately come to a valley whose waters had been
adjudicated according to Montana procedure in 1899. The relative rights
of the ranchers had seemed well settled long before the water-shortage of
the 1930's induced Mr. Reeder to flout Judge Bennett's order and Com-
missioner Calvert's administration. The Commissioner, supported by the
Associate Professor of Law, Montana State University. Member of the California
Bar. B.A., University of California, 1943; LL.B., Duke University, 1948.
'State ex rel. Reeder v. District Court, 100 Mont. 376, 47 P.2d 653 (1935). The basis
of the decision was that Mr. Reeder's rights had never been adjudicated, and to
summarily relegate him to an inferior position might result in depriving him of a
property right without due process of law. The necessary effect of Reeder's activi-
ties on the performance of the commissioner's duties was not fully considered, as
the supreme court insisted on the view that a person taking water under an un-
adjudicated claim could not possibly interfere with the commissioner's administra-
tion of adjudicated claims. Accord, State ex rel. Pew v. District Court, 34 Mont.
233, 85 Pac. 525 (1906) ; State ex rcl. Boston & Montana Con. C. & S. Min. Co. v.
District Court, 30 Mont. 96, 75 Pac. 956 (1904).
So far as the due process point is concerned, the Reeder case appears to be on
more solid ground than the Boston & Montana Con. Mini. Co. case, supra, relied on
by the court. In that case it appears that the contemner was a party to an injunc-
tion proceeding wherein he was enjoined. It was not argued that he was improper-
ly before the court, that he had not personally subjected himself to the jurisdiction
of the court, nor that there was any defect in the procedure so far as opportunity to
be heard and defend is concerned. The objection was that there was insufficient
evidence to sustain the plaintiff's claim, and that defendant's title should not be
tried in an injunction proceeding. But cf. United States v. United Mine Workers
of America and John L. Lewis, 330 U. S. 258 (1947) ; State er rel. Silve v. District
Court, 105 Mont. 106, 69 P.2d 972 (1937) ; State cx rel. Tague v. District Court, 100
Mont. 383, 47 P.2d 649 (1935) ; State ex rel. Zosel v. District Court, 56 Mont. 578,
185 Pac. 1112 (1919). The latter three cases are briefly discussed in note 14 infra.
See also Irion v. Hyde, 107 Mont. 84, 81 P.2d 353 (1938), and Parsons v. Mussig-
brod, 59 Mont. 336, 196 Pac. 528 (1921), wherein parties to injunction proceedings
were temporarily restrained in a water right suit. (See discussion at 27 infra.)
The other case relied on by the supreme court in the Reeder case, supra, was
Reeder case, there had been no prior action affording relator the opportunity to
ascertain his relative right to water. In both the Reeder and Pew cases the relator
was hailed into court in answer to a "show cause" order, and restrained. (In the
Pew case, relator brought certiorari to review the order-he was not in contempt.)
As stated by Justice Brantley in the Pew case, at 237: "In other words the court
... enjoined him in a summary proceeding, in a cause in which he claimed an inde-
pendent right, finally and absolutely adjudicated that he had no such right, and
that, too, upon summary notice of less than twenty-four hours." The Pew case may
be distinguished from the familiar temporary injunction case on the ground that
in the Pew case the trial judge apparently made a final adjudication.
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Judge, decided that since Mr. Reeder's claim had never been adjudicated,
he would have to go without water just like those whose priorities had been
adjudicated as inferior. After the supreme court overruled the judge,
did the ranchers on Red Rock River have any rights or priorities that they
could count on during dry years?
The fierce contention of westerners for water resulted in a unique and
indigenous legal structure which was called "the appropriation system.'"
But as population, industry and agriculture grew in the west, some of the
basic ideas of the system were drawn into question: First, should a person
be able to acquire an unchanging right to a large volume of water which
would endure notwithstanding changing conditions in his community and
state? Second, should there be a more rapid and conclusive determination
and stronger enforcement of water rights to replace self-help and the de-
lays of litigation which arise whenever there is a local water shortage?
The pressures which raised these questions have forced changes in the
legal structure.' All western legislatures have developed modifications to
fit the needs of the different states. However, Montana's greatest depar-
ture from the appropriation system was short lived and occurred nearly a
century ago.' Since then our legislature has found the original concepts
of "first in time first in right" and individual enforcement of rights, suf-
ficient for determining and administering water rights in Montana.' And
along with that "hands off" policy, the legislature has never provided a
procedure which would enable the owner of a water right to finally estab-
lish his priority by a conclusive adjudication.'
This article examines the workings of the Montana system, appraises
how well it is serving us, and ventures a look into the future.
'For a discussion of the historical development of the "appropriation" systems of
acquiring a right to use water, see WiEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES
c. 5 (3d ed. 1911) ; and for a succinct statement, see 27 R.C.L., Waters § 168 (1920).
'One observer declared as early as 1929: "At this point prior-appropriation has
suddenly vanished .... " Lasky, From Prior Appropriation to Economic Distribu-
tion of Water by the State-Via Irrigation Administration, 1 RocKY MT. L. REV.
248, 269 (1929).
4The first territorial legislature, which convened at Bannack in December, 1864,
enacted that in the event of a water shortage on a stream, the nearest justice of
the peace should appoint three commissioners to equitably apportion the water to
the various localties, for the best interest of all parties concerned. Laws of Montana
1864 (1st Session). This enactment however was not favored by the Montana
Supreme Court. It held that such an apportionment was void for the reason that
the three commissioners were exercising judicial powers which could not be granted
to them under the organic act of the Territory. Thorp v. Woolman, 1 Mont. 168,
170 (1870).
'Among western states Montana alone has no comprehensive statutes controlling
the acquisition and administration of water rights, and has no centralization of that
administration. SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE WATER LAW, NATIONAL RESOURCES PLAN-
NING BOARD, REPORT TO THE WATER RESOURCES COMMITTEE, STATE WATER LAW IN THE
DEvELOPMENT OF THE WEST 99-111 (1943). Following litigation, however, a court
commissioner may be appointed to administer the decreed rights. REVISED CoDEs OF
MONTANA, 1947, § 89-1001 (hereinafter the REvIsED CODES OF MONTANA are cited as
R.C.M.).
Montana's present legislative framework, insofar as it deals with private water
rights, is principally a codification of the law of appropriation rights as that law
existed in its earlier days in the middle of the 19th century.
'he inconclusiveness of an adjudication, so far as strangers to the decree are con-
cerned, has been recognized several times since the Reeder case. See, e.g., Wills
v. Morris, 100 Mont. 514, 523, 50 P.2d 862, 865 (1935) (prior decree admitted In
evidence against person not a party thereto, but with the explicit reservation that
[Vol. 19,
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PERSONS NOT PARTIES TO THE ADJUDICATION'
The basic provision in Montana law providing for stream adjudication
by private parties is R.C.M. 1947, § 89-815:
In any action hereafter commenced for the protection of rights
acquired to water under the laws of this state, the plaintiff may
make any or all persons who have diverted water from the same
stream or source, parties to such action, and the court may in one
judgment settle the relative priorities and rights of all the parties
to such action .... (emphasis added)
This provision does not require the joinder of all water-users in the
vicinity, nor is there any procedure whereby presently unknown persons
who may later claim a superior right can be compelled to come forward
and prove such claim or be barred The absence of this latter procedure,
which would make a water adjudication an in rem proceeding and truly
he is not bound thereby) ; Sherlock v. Greaves, 106 Mont. 206, 214 P.2d 87 (1937)
(same) ; Cook v. Hudson, 110 Mont. 263, 284, 103 P.2d 137, 147 (1940) (same) ; and
the earlier case of Galiger v. McNulty, 80 Mont. 339, 350, 260 Pac. 401, 403 (1927)
(same) ; see State ex rel. Swanson v. District Court, 107 Mont. 203, 209, 82 P.2d
779, 782 (1938). State ex rel. McNight v. District Court, 111 Mont. 520, 111 P.2d
292 (1941), has an impact upon water administration much like the Reeder case.
The district court instructed the water commissioner to distribute water under
three separate decrees, integrating the various rights according to their decreed
dates. The commissioner had been appointed in one of those three proceedings,
which was the one in which relatrix was a party. Integrating the three decrees re-
sulted in recognizing earlier decreed rights of a canal company. On writ of review
the supreme court (with two dissents) held that the trial court's order to the com-
missioner to distribute under all three decrees was null and void. The reason:
although all disputants had decreed rights, they had never before been parties to
the same action, and hence their relative rights had not been adjudiciated inter
se8e. The gist of the opinion is this (at 524) : "Since the respective rights of
relatrix and of the plaintiff have not been adjudicated as against each other, It is
apparent that relatrix's rights cannot, in a summary proceeding of the nature in
question, be subordinated to those of the plaintiff."
State ex tel. Pew v. District Court, 34 Mont. 233, 85 Pac. 525 (1906), is the real
forerunner of the Reeder case, being essentially parallel to it. The Reeder case
was cited with approval on the point in question in Quigley v. McIntosh, 110 Mont.
495, 500, 103 P.2d 1067, 1069 (1940), and State ex tel. Mungas v. District Court,
102 Mont. 533, 537, 59 P.2d 71, 73 (1936).
"'Parties" as used herein means persons named in the proceeding, as distinguished
from the "parties" in a quiet title action, who may also include "all persons, known
or unknown, claiming, or who might claim, any right, title, estate, or interest."
R.C.M. 1947, § 93-6204.
8R.C.M. 1947, § 89-829 requires a new appropriator on an already adjudicated stream
to join all whose rights may be affected by the new appropriation. R.C.M. 1947,
§ 89-830 permits service by publication for this proceeding. However, since § 89-829
requires the petitioner to "give the names of all appropriators or claimants who
have, or appear to have, rights in the source of supply," and no mention is made of
unknown claimants, the proceeding has not been broadened to an in rem one.
Similarly, R.C.M. 1947, § 89-835 provides that one who is not a party to a decree
may petition the court for an order establishing his relative right and making him
a party to the prior decree. It Incorporates the procedural provisions of §§ 89-829
and 89-830, supra. But the language is not mandatory. State ez tel. McNight v.
District Court, 111 Mont. 520, 111 P.2d 292 (1941).
This section (89-835) Is followed by a provision which appears to put teeth into
the law. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-836: "Any person not a party, or privy, to a decree
... who shall divert the water thereof when it shall be needed by another, without
first complying with the terms of this act, shall be . . . punished by. .. ."
Insofar as appropriators claiming a right acquired subsequent to the decree,
and subsequent to 1921 are concerned, the enactment has teeth. In Anaconda
National Bank v. Johnson, 75 Mont. 401, 244 Pac. 141 (1926), the would-be appro-
1957]
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analogous to a quiet title action,' is the reason for the inconclusiveness of
water-right adjudications. Private adjudication of streams in Montana
remains an in personam affair with absolutely no binding effect upon un-
named persons who are not served so as to bring them personally before
the court." And since the principal value of a water right is its priority-
its relative position with respect to other water rights-the failure to fix
a final priority removes much of the value of an adjudication under the
statute.'
priator under those circumstances was denied a water right. And in Donich v.
Johnson, 77 Mont. 229, 250 Pac. 963 (1926), the court held that these code sections
provide the only method whereby an appropriation can be made from an adjudicated
stream. But such a claim to so inferior a priority cannot be a threat to the ad-
judicated rights anyhow.
Section 89-836, quoted above, seems equally applicable to persons claiming a
right prior to the adjudication. It has not been so applied, and the cases appear to
stand in the way of such an application. State e.r rel. McNight v. District Court,
111 Mont. 520, 111 P.2d 292 (1941) ; State ex. rel. Reeder v. District Court, 100 Mont.
376, 47 P.2d 653 (1935) ; see also cases cited note 6 supra. None of those cases,
however, involve a post-1921 adjudication combined with the assertion by a non-
party of a post-1921 right which antedates the decree. Arguably, such a claim
should be held to be subject to the condition of compliance with the 1921 legislation
interpreted to be applicable to all post-1921 appropriations. The condition would
be that if there is a later adjudication, this appropriator must have his appropria-
tion adjudicated in order to maintain his right. As time goes by, the likelihood of
such a situation arising becomes greater.
It seems more likely that the legislation will be held to apply only to persons
whose claims date after the respective adjudications.
'See R.C.M. 1947, tit. 93, c. 62 for the procedure for quieting title.
10WEIL, WATER RIOHTS IN THE WESTERN STATrs § 626 (3d ed. 1911). See also cases
cited note 6 supra. Montana water-right suits have been erroneously referred to as
essentially "quiet title" actions in Sain v. Montana Power Co., 84 F.2d 126, 127
(9fh Cir. 1936) ; State ex rel. Reeder v. District Court, 100 Mont. 376, 47 P.2d 653
(1935) ; Whitcomb v. Murphy, 94 Mont. 562, 566, 23 P.2d 980, 981 (1933), and Pat-
ten, Water Rights in Montana, 23 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 162, 169-170 (1950). Notwith-
standing the foregoing authority, the analogy of the familiar statutory quiet title
action (R.C.M. 1947, tit. 93, c. 62) is too imperfect to be helpful because the real
value of a water right is its priority, not the judicial sanction of so many inches
as of such and such a date. And as pointed out in note 8 supra, the water-right suit
is not an action in rem, which is an obvious fundamental distinction.
The analogy of a water-right suit to the old equity bill of peace is more exact.
As in that bill, a plaintiff may join diverse parties to avoid multiplicity where there
is a community of interest In the subject matter of the action, and common question
of law and fact. See Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 369, 93 N.W.
781 (1903) ; Lasky, From Prior Appropriation to Economic Distribution of Water
by the State-Via Irrigation Administration, 1 RocxY MT. L. Rrv. 161, 189 (1929) ;
Chafee, Bills of Peace with Multiple Partie8, 45 HAnv. L. REv. 1297, 1321-1328
(1932).
Where there has already been an adjudication, and then some additional person
poses the threat of taking water under an unadjudicated claim, there is analogy to
quia timet. The theory is that the claimant refuses to bring his action under R.C.M.
1947, § 89-835 and there is hazard in further delay which will make defense more
difficult through loss of witnesses and fading memories. Plaintiff has an equitable
interest in having his rights settled. An action may be brought quia timet to com-
pel the claimant to litigate now his cause of action under R.C.M. 1947, § 89-835.
See note 46 infra.
uHowever this does not leave the holder of adjudicated rights in a helpless position.
The prior decree is prima facie evidence of the date and amount of his claim,
R.C.M. 1947, § 89-839; Wills v. Morris, 100 Mont. 514, 522, 50 P.2d 862, 865 (1935)
(and cases cited therein), and he may enjoin the obstreperous non-party as set
forth at 27 infra.
[Vol. 19,
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ADDITIONAL CLAIMS OF PARTIES TO THE ADJUDICATION
The same statute' raises a similar problem with respect to persons who
were parties to a prior adjudication. Can a person who was a party, and
whose right was adjudicated, come along later to assert that he had another
priar right which was not adjudicated? Should he be permitted a second
litigation with neighbors in another effort to improve his relative position?
The statute does not require a party to litigate with respect to all .of
his claims.' The statute apparently contemplates this situation: Two
farmers may agree that the first farmer has a superior water right (say,
e.g., a 1940 right) but they disagree over the priority of their claims to
additional water (as, e.g., where each claims additional water as of some-
time in 1955). So they litigate the relative priority of their 1955 appro-
priations. After that is all over, should it be thought to have any effect
upon the 1940 right of the first farmer? The supreme court has handled
such cases ad hoc, with cases holding each way.'
The supreme court is faced with the practical administration of jus-
tice, which would be greatly facilitated if parties put all of their rights in
"R.C.M. 1947, § 89-915.
"2Ibid. (note the repetition in the statute of the permissive word "may") ; Missoula
Light and Water Co. v. Hughes, 106 Mont. 355, 374, 77 P.2d 1041, 1051 (1938);
Brennan v. Jones, 101 Mont. 550, 562, 55 P.2d 697, 699 (1935) ; Bennett v. Quinlan,
47 Mont. 247, 253, 131 Pac. 1067, 1069 (1913) ; Sloan v. Byers, 37 Mont. 503, 513,
97 Pac. 855, 858 (1908). Indeed, in Sloan v. Byers, supra at 513, the supreme
court questioned the power of the legislature to compel persons to litigate uncon-
tested rights.
"'On the one hand, see cases cited note 13 8upra. On the other hand, see State
ex rel. Zosel v. District Court, 56 Mont. 578, 185 Pac. 1112 (1919) (where, in an
original application to review an order adjudging relator guilty of contempt, relator
attempted to show that he had developed a new source of supply and therefore did
not interfere with any decreed prior rights. Relator was a party to the original
decree, which distinguishes the case from State ex rel. Reeder v. District Court,
100 Mont. 376, 47 P.2d 653 (1935), and State ex rel. Pew v. District Court, 34
Mont. 233, 75 Pac. 956 (1906). The relator's application was dismissed.) ; State
em rel. Tague v. District Court, 100 Mont. 383, 47 P.2d 649 (1935) (substantially
similar to the Zosel case, supra, and expressly distinguished by the court from the
Reeder case on the ground indicated above. Relator claimed a non-adjudicated
right unsuccessfully.) ; and State ex rel. Silve v. District Court, 105 Mont. 106,
69 P.2d 972 (1937) (likewise similar to the Zosel case, supra, and where relator
unsuccessfully tried to prove that his use of water did not interfere with the down-
stream prior decreed rights.) In each of the latter cases the contention was that
relator was doing something which was not included or provided for in the decree.
In each the relator lost. In each the supreme court opinion makes the claim ap-
pear quite transparent and weak. Perhaps that Is the feature which distinguishes
them from the cases cited in note 13 supra. But one hesitates to jump to a con-
clusion which can be manufactured so easily by a statement of a case which is
intended to support a particular conclusion.
At any rate, there is authority both ways on the situation where a party to the
adjudication later claims a prior unadjudicated right. The impelling reason for
holding the party bound, at least in a contempt proceeding, is practical: the need
for orderly administration of water rights where there is a water shortage. Against
this, there is the statute which is permissively worded. As a practical matter, the
supreme court's approach seems satisfactory: if the claim appears to be too frail,
let the trial judge order the party to cease interfering. The matter goes back to
the discretion of the trial judge. If title cannot be finally determined in a con-
tempt proceeding, still it is inescapable that title must frequently be guessed at for
temporary purposes, so long as there Is an opportunity to litigate rights in full
in another proceeding. See R.C.M. 1947, § 89-815. As a more theoretical matter,
where the party iq personally before a trial judge who has jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter, he may be made to obey the trial judge's order, whether or not his
claim looks substantial-and the enforcement is through contempt. (See cases dis-
cussed in this note.)
1957]
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issue in one proceeding and then were barred from making additional
claims.' The probabilities are that a party to a decree has put forward his
best and earliest claims, as well as any inferior claims which may be liti-
gated. This probability undoubtedly has had an influence upon those
holdings of the supreme court in which the subsequent assertion of an
earlier right has been summarily denied." But without taking evidence in
a full scale adjudication proceeding the court cannot be sure that any such
claim is spurious," and in view of the underlying statute" a claimant can-
not be held to have failed in any obligation imposed on him by law. These
two reasons balance the practical considerations, with the result that there
can never be certainty in this area of the law."
GEOGRAPHICAL EXTENT OF ADJUDICATION
The first important determination which must be made by one who
seeks a right to water, is whether his area of the stream has at any time
been previously adjudicated. If it has, he must go through a court pro-
ceeding to obtain an appropriation.' On the other hand, if the area of the
stream from which he desires to take water has not been adjudicated, he
may obtain a water-right without going to court, and thus avoid costs and
proceedings. In fact, in the latter case he has no business in court.
But our statutes which are very narrow when it comes to determining
who is bound by an adjudication are outlandishly broad with respect to
"U!7. State em rel. Sllve v. District Court, 105 Mont. 106, 110, 69 P.2d 972, 974 (1937).
"See note 14 8upra.
"See note 13 supra; see also note 6 supra.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 89-815.
"Whenever the law attempts to balance competing considerations, and permits the
use of reasonable discretion to accomplish that balance, the outcome of borderline
cases becames uncertain. But many situations can nevertheless be handled with
sure-footedness. The issue under discussion is likely to arise under R.C.M. 1947,
§ 89-1015 (complaint by dissatisfied water-user to obtain an order directing the
commissioner to distribute in accord with the prior decree) in which the disobedient
claimant will be served. If he is asserting the same old right which was adjudi-
cated, of course the court and the commissioner may properly supervise his use.
If he does not assert any right at all for taking water in addition to that awarded
by the prior decree, a fortiori his rights will not be infringed upon by a restraining
order. If he asserts a claim which seems to the trial judge patently insubstantial
the trial court should have power to make a preliminary determination, just as in
the ordinary case of a preliminary injunction. It should be a matter of discretion.
If it appears that claimant's claim to an additional right is likely sound, the trial
court should not restrain him, but should leave it for a more complete adjudication.
This amount of guessing seems appropriate in a proceeding under R.C.M. 1947,
§ 89-1015 and the contempt proceeding which may follow; and there seems no rea-
son to conclude that his rights are being finally determined, because R.C.M. 1947,
§ 89-815 does not preclude a claimant from bringing an action to formally ad-
judicate his claim. State eo rel. Silve v. District Court, 105 Mont. 106, 112, 69
P.2d 972, 975 (1937) ; State ex rel. Tague v. District Court, 100 Mont. 383, 391,
47 P.2d 649, 652 (1935) ; State ew rel. Zosel v. District Court, 56 Mont. 578, 581,
185 Pac. 1112, 1113 (1919).
"R.C.M. 1947, § 89-829 provides the procedure for appropriating waters of adjudi-
cated streams, using the mandatory word "shall." Section 89-837 states that the
failure to comply deprives the "appropriator" of the right to use any water, as
against any subsequent person who does comply. Donich v. Johnson, 77 Mont. 229,
250 Pac. 963 (1926), held that this statutory method of appropriating from an ad-
judicated stream was made the exclusive method by the 1921 Laws. That case
also Is authority (at 245-246) that the very similar 1907 statutes (Laws of Montana,
1907, c. 185) were not exclusive. The 1921 Laws are in c. 228.
[Vol. 19,
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how many miles of stream are adjudicated.' It has not yet been determined
how far upstream toward the tributaries, nor how far downstream toward
the mouth, the waters of a stream are affected by a single adjudication.
If these laws are not to be held void for vagueness" then the process of
definition by the courts will have to work out some limiting rule of reason
for the future.'
The most apparent and probable basis of limiting the geographical
extent of an adjudication is economic: the effect will be limited to the
directly affected economic area. An adjudication downstream on the Mis-
souri or the Clark Fork likely will not have any significant effect at
present because of the large volume of water and the lack of intense indus-
trial use of it. So the effect of the adjudication will likely not be extended
upstream or downstream. But an adjudication upon a stream where short-
ages of water frequently occur will likely be extended upstream and up
tributaries, and then downstream until a large enough body of water is
reached so that the economic effect of the adjudicated use is dissipated.
This will result in the requirement that within the affected area, all new
appropriations must be pursuant to the 1921 statutes,' requiring a court
proceeding. The person seeking a new appropriation is at present left to
guess at a proper interpretation of the facts and whether a court proceed-
ing is required.
ADJUDICATION BY STATE ENGINEER
Since 1939 the State Engineer has been authorized to bring actions to
adjudicate streams.' A primary legislative purpose was the establishment
of a record of water use in Montana on interstate streams." Even though
private rights might not be conclusively settled inter sese, in negotiations
with downstream states these decrees would be useful in establishing the
"R.C.M. 1947, § 89-815 employs the descriptive language: "plaintiff may make any
or all persons who have diverted water from the same stream or source, parties."
(Emphasis added, to set out the words which describe the geographical extent of
the adjudication). Section 89-829 speaks chiefly in terms of "source of supply."
Section 89-833 uses "8tream or source of supply" together with some miscellaneous
descriptions. Such descriptions are used in §§ 89-835, 836, 837, 839, 840, 841, 842
and 844. Occasionally the word "river" creeps in, but apparently It is not used In
a manner to distinguish it from "stream."
2See the excellent article, Aigler, Legislation in Vague or General Terms, 21 MIcH.
L. REv. 831 (1923).
'Montana cases do not yet delineate the geographical extent to be given an adjudi.
cation, but the absence of cases wherein the courts have looked upstream and down-
stream to see if the water involved in the suit was anywhere subject to an adjudi-
cation is persuasive that the statute simply is not being given a geographically
broad interpretation.
If maximum geographic scope were given an adjudication (simple water-right
suit between two farmers) on the Missouri, and another on the Yellowstone River,
near the Dakota boundary, nearly all of the water east of the Continental Divide
would be adjudicated. This results from an application of the frequently used
words "stream" and "source," as well as from the description in R.C.M. 1947,
§ 89-844 of the "effect of decree," which includes "a tributary or feeder." Con-
ceivably an adjudication far upstream would result in the entire "stream" below
it being- adjudicated (but probably not downstream tributaries).
-R.C.M. 1947, §§ 89-829-855.
"Laws of Montana, 1939, c. 185; R.C.M. 1947, §§ 89-846-855. The State Engineer
brings such actions at the direction of the state water conservation board. R.C.M.
1947, 89-855.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 89-847.
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need and use in Montana. That purpose is more efficiently accomplished
through the county-by-county water resources survey. Therefore it is not
surprising that the office of the State Engineer has emphasized this survey
to the exclusion of actions to adjudicate,' as such actions have the same
defects as private adjudications' in so far as unknown parties' or unliti-
gated claims' are concerned.
COPING WITH THE SYSTEM
The problem which is most likely to vex lawyers, is how to protect a
client against someone upstream taking his water under a previously un-
asserted claim of prior right."' The situation will arise when there isn't suf-
ficient water to sustain all of the ranches, a situation so critical that a
normal adjudication under R.C.M. 1947, § 89-815, or a typical proceeding
to have a Commissioner'distribute water pursuant to a prior decree,' with-
out provisional relief, is inadequate because these normal processes are too
slow.
"To date no actions to adjudicate have been brought under this law. Letter from
Fred E. Buck, State Engineer, to author, Nov. 22, 1957.
18R.C.M. 1947, § 89-856. Presumably there is implied authority to serve process upon
all persons in the area to be adjudicated, and that the procedure is intended to
parallel an 89-815 action. The statute is not explicit.
2This chapter, Laws of Montana, 1947, c. 185 (R.C.M. 1947, §§ 89-846-855), makes
no attempt to convert such suits to actions in rem. Hence the effect is the same
as an action under § 89-815.
aAgain, there is no provision to assure that parties will place all of their rights
In issue. But see notes 48 and 49 infra.
"It makes no difference whether there has been a prior adjudication, except that
if this upstream claimant was a party to one, there is a greater likelihood that a
summary proceeding (e.g., under R.C.M. 1947, §§ 89-1-001 or 1015) would be suc-
cessful. See discussion, note 19 supra.
This particular problem, of the surprise assertion of a long unexercised (or
never exercised) right has a close connection to the law of abandonment. For with
a statute such as Wyoming's, where non-user for five successive years amounts to
abandonment (WVY. CorNP. STAT. ANN. § 71-701 (1945)), such latent or dormant
claims could not be asserted.
In Montana, the law of abandonment of water-rights was given an uncertain
start in Barkley v. Tieleke, 2 Mont. 59 (1874), where a chain of title was worked
out through abandonment (later disapproved in McDonald v. Lannen, 19 Mont. 78,
47 Pac. 648 (1897)). But by the time of Meagher v. Hardenbrok, 11 Mont. 385, 28
Pac. 648 (1891), the judicial handling of abandonment for this purpose had be-
come crystallized, and this much was clear: to prove abandonment one had to
prove intent to abandon. Tucker v. Jones, 8 Mont. 225, 19 Pac. 571 (1888) ; McCau-
ley v. McKieg, 8 Mont. 389, 21 Pac. 22 (1889). Since then the cases finding aban-
donment are extremely rare (see, e.g., Head v. Hale, 38 Mont. 302, 100 Pac. 222
(1909)), and very obscure in application (Power v. Switzer, 21 Mont. 523, 55 Pac.
32 (1898)) ; notwithstanding that abandonment is made an issue in many water-
right cases. Irion v. Hyde, 107 Mont. 84, 81 P.2d 353 (1938) ; Mussellshell Valley
F. & L. Co. v. Cooley, 86 Mont. 276, 283 Pac. 213 (1929) ; Rodda v. Best, 68 Mont.
205, 217 Pac. 669 (1923) ; Thomas v. Ball, 66 Mont. 161, 213 Pac. 597 (1923) ; Moore
v. Sherman, 52 Mont. 542, 1591 Pac. 966 (1916) ; Featherman v. Hennessy, 42 Mont.
535, 113 Pac. 751 (1911) ; Norman v. Corbley, 32 Mont. 195, 79 Pac. 1059 (1905) ;
Sloan v. Glancy, 19 Mont. 70, 47 Pac. 334 (1897) ; Smith v. Hope Mining Co., 18
Mont. 432, 45 Pac. 632 (1896) ; Gassert v. Noyes, 18 Mont. 206, 44 Pac. 959 (1896) ;
Middle Creek Ditch Co. v. Henry, 1. Mont. 558, 39 Pac. 1054 (1895) : Kleinschmidt
v. Greiser, 14 Mont. 484, 37 Pac. 5 (1893). Not the least of the difficulties in-
volved is the usual requirement that the burden of proof is upon the person as-
serting abandonment. Thomas v. Ball, 66 Mont. 161, 213 Pac. 597 (1923). The
requirement of proving intent to abandon has been a most difficult hurdle, even
though occasionally some hope is offered, e.g., that ten years of non-user is potent
evidence of Intent to abandon. Sloan v. Glancy, 19 Mont. 70, 47 Pac. 334 (1897).
-R,C.M. 1947, § 89-1001 or 89-1015.
[Vol. 19,
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The solution does not lie in any esoteric procedures peculiar to water
law.' The problem presents a case in equity, and the solution lies in
familiar equity proceedings. A complaint may be filed which states the
facts of insufficient water and the impending irreparable injury to plain-
tiff's property interests." The complaint should also set forth the facts
with respect to any prior adjudication ' and whatever else is within the
positive knowledge" of plaintiff with respect to the defendant's claim."
Plaintiff should pray for a temporary restraining order,' ex parte if speed
is essential' or upon an order to show cause if more time may be taken."
The ultimate purpose of the complaint should be to adjudicate the claim
and right of the defendant in relation to plaintiff's rights." It may also
seek to adjudicate defendant's right in relation to any other parties to a
prior decree if there was one." In the latter case the additional parties
must of course be served as defendants.' The complaint should plead as
.ne cause of action a simple adjudication under R.C.M. 1947, § 89-815, using
the prior decree, if any, as evidence suppolting the adjudicated rights."
Other possible causes of action may of course be pleaded also. ' One such
possibility would be a cause similar to that provided by R.C.M. 1947,
§ 89-835, resting upon a demand that equity recognize the need for such
relief on the part of persons whose claims have been adjudicated. That
code section is n6t designed for the use of such persons, but rather for the
"The lawyer has had sufficient warning that where the upstream claimant is neither
party nor privy to a prior decree, the solution does not lie in the water-law statutes.
State ex rel. Reeder v. District Court, 100 Mont. 376, 47 P.2d 653 (1935), and see
note 6 supra.
'See, e.g., the quotation from the complaint in Parsons v. Mussigbrod, 59 Mont. 336,
339, 196 Pac. 528, 529 (1921).
'In two water-right injunction cases there is no indication that there ever was a
prior adjudication. Irion v. Hyde, 107 Mont. 84, 81 P.2d 353 (1938) ; Parsons v.
Mussigbrod, 59 Mont. 336, 196 Pac. 528 (1921).
"One may not obtain a temporary restraining order unless the complaint is verified,
and the facts therein are stated as of plaintiff's positive knowledge rather than
on information and belief. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-4205; and see the references to al-
legations "positively verified" in Parsons v. Mussigbrod, 59 Mont. 336, 339, 196 Pac.
528, 529 (1921).
87The complaint may be supplemented by further elaboration of facts in an accom-
panying affidavit. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-4205.
'See generally R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-4202-4216.
"R.C.M. 1947, §§ 96-4202, 4205, and 4206; Irion v. Hyde, 107 Mont. 84, 81 P.2d
353 (1938) ; Parsons v. Mussingbrod, 59 Mont. 336, 196 Pac. 528 (1921).
4"R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-4202, 4208.
'As was approved in the Parsons and Irion eases, note 39 supra.
'"Thus the underlying cause of action is an adjudication under R.C.M. 1947, § 89-815,
and it accomplishes the same objective that a proceeding brought by the defendant
under R.C.M. 1947, § 89-835 would accomplish.
Of course an action under § 89-815 may be brought against the defendant even
where there is not the Imminent peril which calls for 'n injunction.
"See LC.M. 1947, § 89-815.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 89-839; Wills v. Morris, 100 Mont. 514, 522, 50 P.2d 862, 865
(193-5), and cases cited therein.
" E.g., to have a water commissioner appointed under R.C.M. 1947, § 89-1001; or to
have such a commissioner distribute the water in accord with a prior decree under
R.C.M. 1947, § 89-1015;; or to recover damages for the harm which has occurred by
reason of defendant's taking of water. Caveat: damages cannot be pleaded in
Montana where others are made parties, and these others are not affected by this
cause of action. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-3203. For a form of quia timet relief, see note
46 infra.
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use of persons who were not parties to a prior decree. Hence the gist of
the cause last suggested would be quia timet."
The immediate purpose of the action is to obtain an injunction which
will save the client's ranching or farming operation. Albeit any injunction
or restraining order is within the discretion of the trial judge, nevertheless
the case is one wherein the remedy may properly be granted."
It is suggested that in any adjudication proceeding the parties may ob-
tain some degree of protection for the future by pleading that the other
parties to the action have certain specific rights and no others, and by
insisting that the decree recite that the parties have no other rights, enjoin-
ing all of the parties from taking water other than as decreed." The pro-
tection obtainable by such a pleading and decree is not yet certain." How
germane to the litigated claims is this lately asserted prior right? It is at
least arguable that the purpose of the proceeding was to settle all of the
water rights of the parties and that the factual issues were sufficiently
broad to have included any later asserted unlitigated right. Thus any
second suit between the same parties should be barred under the doctrine
of res judicata.
THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE
In some fundamental respects, Montana is in a delightful position with
respect to the state of its water law. The legislative arm of the government
has been restrained so that Montanans are not saddled with bureaus, in-
spectors, administrative agencies and the like. On unadjudicated streams
(or perhaps unadjudicated parts of streams) a person may take water and
acquire a right to it without asking the permission of the government."
And individual freedom of action has survived in such robust health that
it is possible at any time for an upstream user to upset an established
"The complaint should set forth that the defendant has a cause of action under
§ 89-835 which defendant will not himself prosecute at the present time, and that
plaintiff needs the protection of a prompt adjudication before time washes away
memories and witnesses. See note 10 supra.
"R.C.M. 1947, §§ 934204, 802, and 4206.
"This was apparently done in the adjudication involved in State ex rel. Silve v. Dis-
trict Court, 105 Mont. 106, 69 P.2d 972 (1937), for the supreme court quotes the
prior decree as follows (at 110) : ". . . and that all parties to the decree were
,restrained and enjoined from in any manner using or diverting the waters of
Davis Creek or Martin Creek and their tributaries in any other manner or in any
other amounts than' as decreed."
This form of decree aided the supreme court in holding that relator's diversion
constituted prima facie a violation of the decree, and a contempt. Relator's applica-
tion for a writ was denied.
"The supreme court in Sloan v. Byers, 37 Mont. 503, 513, 97 Pac. 855, 858 (1908),
questioned whether the legislature could compel persons to litigate, and have de-
creed, rights which others were not contesting. Arguably, the trial court would be
similarly limited. And an allegation in a pleading that the defendant has no
other or further rights might be construed strictly in view of the context of the
proceeding, as with an application of the rule ejusdem generis. Such Is the nature
of legal risks. The plaintiff nevertheless Is entitled to contest defendant's rights
to the water, and the plaintiff is in a better position than the legislature to compel
the defendant to litigate his rights. Moreover, the plaintiff has considerable free-
dom to frame the Issues so as to have an adjudication as broad as needed. State
ex rel. Silve v. District Court, 105 Mont. 106, 110, 69 P.2d 972, 974 (1937).
"See notes 4 and 5 8upra.
"See discussion at 24 supra.
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routine of water distribution by taking water under claim of an unadjudi-
cated prior right."
This absence of real control and regulation could exist nowhere but in
a state which combines a sparse population' and meager economy" with an
abundant water supply.' There has indeed been a relatively small volume
of litigation over water rights in the Montana Supreme Court in recent
years.' In the balance which must be reached between regulation and
' Either as one who was not a party to the prior adjudication (see discussion at 21
supra) ; or as one who was a party but who has a prior right which was not an
issue in the prior adjudication (See 23 supra) ; or simply as a water-user on a
stream which has not yet been adjudicated.
'a"Montana is a state of great expanses and relatively few people .... According to
recent UT. S. Bureau of Census estimates, Montana in 1956 had about 638,000 peo-
ple .... ." MONTANA STATE UNIvEusiTy, THE MONTANA ALMANAC 161 (1957 ed.).
Montana ranks 43rd among the states in population. U. S. BUREAU o CENSUS, Ds'T.
OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U. S. 13 (1956).
4The STATISTICAL ABSTRACT or THE UNITED STATES, 1956, U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS,
op. et. supra note 53, reports the following: personal income in the U. S. in 1954
amounted to over $285 billion, of which Montana's share was just over $1 billion
(at 299) ; Montana had 0.37% of the personal income of the United States (at 302) ;
total assets of banks in the U.S. in 1954 was over $232 billion of which Montana's
share was $727 million (at 435) ; total taxable payrolls in the U.S. 1st quarter,
1953, totaled nearly $34 billion, of which Montana's share was $81 million (at 490) ;
the value of farms in the U.S. in 1954 was estimated at $76 billion, of which Mon-
tana's share was $1% billion (at 622) ; the value of farm products sold in the U.S.
in 1950 was $22 billion, of which Montana's share was $279 million (at 629) ; cash
receipts from farm marketings and government payments for the U.S. In 1955 was
$29 billion, of which Montana's share was almost $396 million (at 639) ; Montana
ranked 22nd In value of mineral production In 1953 (at 726) ; Montana ranked 43rd
in 1953 among the states in value added by manufacture (at 805) ; Montana ranked
38th among the states in expenditures for new plant and equipment In 1953 (at
807) ; In value of crops, Montana ranked 3rd in wheat in 1955 (at 664), 3rd In
barley, 1955 (at 667) and 7th in sugar beets, 19.54 (at 679).
"Timber processing is the most important of Montana's manufacturing indus-
tries .... Lumber is the most important product of Montana's forest industries....
In 1952 and 1953, according to some authorities, production exceeded one billion
board feet. This constituted approximately 3 percent of the nation's total."
MONTANA STATE UNIVEmsrry, THE MONTANA ALMANAC 218 (1957 ed.). "Total crude
oil production in the state in 1956 amounted to approximately 21,700,000 barrels.
While this output was less than one percent of the total United States production,
it was the highest ever recorded for the state and was 146 percent greater than
the 1946 output." Id. at 229.
5Approximately half of the flow of the Columbia River has Its source in the north-
ern Rocky Mountain section of the basin. 2 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WATER
RPsounmS POLICY CoMMISSTON 5 (1950). When the flow of the Missouri and its
tributaries is added to the Montana tributaries of the Columbia, it is estimated
that 36,000,000 acre feet of water flows out of the state annually. Address by
Fred E. Buck, State Engineer, before Pacific Northwest Development Assoc., 1953.
West Publishing Company's Pacific Digest lists only seventeen Montana Supreme
Court cases under "Waters and Water Courses" decided between July 1, 1945 and
May 17, 1957. Of those seventeen cases, none challenged a prior adjudication, and
only eight involved a dispute over a right to water. Midkiff v. Kincheloe, 127
Mont. 324, 263 P.2d 976 (1953) ; Stearns v. Benedick, 126 Mont. 272, 247 P.2d 656
(1952) ; Meine v. Ferris, 126 Mont. 210, 247 P.2d 195 (1952) ; Lamping v. Diehl,
126 Mont. 193, 246 P.2d 230 (1925) ; Clausen v. Armington, 123 Mont. 1, 212 P.2d
440 (1949) ; Doney v. Beatty, 124 Mont. 41, 220 P.2d 77 (1950) ; Perkins v. Kramer,
121 Mont. 595, 198 P.2d 475 (1948) ; and Lying v. Rankin. 118 Mont. 235, 165 P.2d
1006 (1946). Of the remaining nine cases, one involved a public water supply
(Crawford v. City of Billings, 297 P.2d 292 Mont. 1956)), two involved
the right to store water and the care of a reservoir (Richland County v. Anderson,
129 Mont. 559, 291 P.2d 267 (1955) ; Farmers Union Oil Co. v. Anderson, 129 Mont.
580, 291 P.2d 604 (1955)), two involved a real property dispute over rights of way
for conducting water (Stalcup v. Cameron Ditch Co., 300 P.2d 511 (Mont. 1956) ;
Hansen v. Galiger, 122 Mont. 418, 208 P.2d 1049 (1949)), two more Involved
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freedom it looks as though our legal structure may be well adapted to the
relative simplicity of our problems. Although there is real difficulty with
our rudimentary system when water shortages occur in particular areas or
during particular years, 7 for the most part we get along fairly well and
enjoy the freedom which is the prime attribute of our system.
Can such an idyllic situation endure in the world of tomorrow? The
nation's demands for water are multiplying by the day.' Stringencies in
the use of water are being forced upon industry and agriculture because
the nation's demand is surpassing the supply of water in many regions.'
Yet, critical as the problem is, it is still one of maldistribution rather than
of a total national shortage of water. ' To remain strong the nation is being
forced to turn to areas which have water but which have not yet attracted
industry. It may be anticipated that industries which rely upon volumes
of water for their existence, will be attracted to Montana. Simultaneously
downstream demands in the Missouri basin will compete for the flow of
our water.'
In a fast changing world many of the institutions which have served
mankind well in the past are tested and found inadequate. Such appears
to be the fate of our water law, which is soon to be faced with inevitable fu-
ture demands that the system was not designed to accommodate.
But Montanans need not submit to the breakdown of the present legal
structure in water law, nor need we impose on our citizenry a bureau-
cratically cumbersome and complicated system such as has resulted in some
other states. There is an opportunity at present to compromise with the
future. The general adequacy of our water supply and our laws at present
land, this time the ownership of the land adjacent to, or under a watercourse (Hel-
land v. Custer County, 127 Mont. 23, 256 P.2d 1085 (1953) ; City of Missoula v.
Bakke, 121 Mont. 534, 198 P.2d 769 (1948)), and two involved proceedings under
the Carey Act (Habets v. Carey Land Act Board, 126 Mont. 46, 244 P.2d 511 (1952) ;
Valier Co. v. State, 123 Mont. 329, 215 P.2d 966, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950)).
0Over twice as many water-law cases reached the Montana Supreme Court in the
period 1930 to 1939 as did during the period 1945 to 1957 (reported in the preceding
footnote). The early 1930's were dry years in Montana, and led to the cases which
very nearly upset our legal system. (E.g., the Reeder case, note 1 supra and its
progeny discussed in note 6 supra..)
58"Water used by industry (including cooling water) Is expected to increase 170 per-
cent during the next 25 years, or from 77 billion to 215 billion gallons per day."
Krause, The Relationship of Federal Activities to Municipal and Industrial Water
Supply, 3 COmMISsioN ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANcir OF THE GOVERN-
wENT, TASK FORCE REPORT ON WATER RESOURCES AND POWER (1955). "We have
reached a point in our economy when only rarely can use be made of water for
some particular purpose without adversely affecting its use for some other pur-
pose." 3 Id., Hoyt, Completition for the Use of Water at 1095, 1099.
%3 Id. at 1099. The December, 1950, Report of the National Association of Manu-
facturers and the Conservation Foundation expresses concern over the nation's
ability in terms of water resources, to provide for national safety and future peace.
'*Krause, supra note 58, at 1233, 1236-7. See also MORRELL, OUR NATION'S WATER
RESOURCES-PoLICIES AND PoLITIcs 7 (1956).
"Downstream states are using more and more water, and at any time may demand
that less water be dissipated through irrigation in Montana. In the Missouri basin
the downstream demands which have received the most discussion are for water to
maintain navigable depths, and to meet requirements for sanitation and domestic
use. Hoyt, supra note 60, at 1095, 1105.
2E.g., California, whose water laws are contained in four fat volumes and whose
legislature has lately become accustomed to many amendments and revisions. The
system is replete with boards, divisions, etc.
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is a blessing which bestows upon us time and freedom to plan. We can
have far more simple and orderly laws and procedures by a relatively small
effort now than we can possibly attain after the water-use problem be-
comes complex with numerous special interests and a legal structure which
has contributed to the chaos.' We have the example of all of the other
western states before us," to learn from their mistakes and profit by those
features of their laws which are simplest, fairest, and best suited to the fu-
ture which we face.
CONCLUSION
Are there any adjudicated streams in Montana? For a person trying
to acquire a new right to water there most definitely are "adjudicated
streams," for he cannot secure an appropriation in many streams without
the court procedures prescribed for acquiring a right on an adjudicated
stream. If there has been any litigation over the waters of the "stream
or source of supply"' it most certainly is "adjudicated" for such per-
sons.'
But in the sense that the words "adjudicated streams" would ordi-
narily connote, there are no adjudicated streams in Montana. There is no
proceeding available whereby the water in a stream can be finally allocated
among users or uses. And although the value of a water right is its position
relative to prior rights, the law does not guaranty a stable relative priority.
"Just one example of the inefficiency which we are currently able to accommodate
but which will become intolerable, is the possibility of multiple litigation as de-
scribed by Chief Justice Callaway in Anaconda National Bank v. Johnson, 75 Mont.
401, 410, 244 Pac. 141, 144 (1926) : "Experience has shown that after the rights
of all of the parties taking water from a stream had been adjudicated, a sub-
sequent appropriator would appear upon the scene, tap the stream and ruthlessly
take the water, disregarding the decreed rights and flaunting [sic] the orders of
the commissioner appointed by the court to distribute the water according to the
terms of the decree. The only remedy the prior appropriators had was to com-
ence a suit against the new appropriator, the result being that all of the rights of
the stream had again to be adjudicated; and after that decree was entered if an-
other subsequent appropriator took the water the same process had to be gone
over again."
With the 1921 legislation this identical difficulty will not occur if the
claimant is asserting a right subsequent to the prior adjudication. But the same
problem and procedure remains where any pre-1921 claim, or any pre-adjudication
claim is asserted.
"E.g., Wyoming, whose laws on water are contained in fewer pages than our own,
but which exercises ownership and control of nearly all waters in the state. Wyo.
CONST. art. 8, § 1, and art. 1, § 31; Wyo. LAws c. 107, § 4 (1947) ; Wyo. ComP.
STAT. ANN. § 71-407 (Supp. 1949). Appropriations are initiated by application to
the State Engineer for a permit. WYO. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 71-238, 249 (1945).
There can be no latent claims or rights under the Wyoming system because of the
constitutional provisions, because the statutory procedure for acquiring a right is
exclusive (Wyoming Hereford Ranch v. Hammond Packing Co., 33 Wyo. 14, 30, 236
Pac. 764, 768 (1925) ; Laramie Rivers Co. v. LeVasseu, 65 Wyo. 414, 431, 202 P.2d
680 (1949)), and because failure to make use of appropriated water for five suc-
cessive years is abandonment and results in forfeiture of the right (Wyo. ComP.
STAT. ANN. § 71-701 (1945)).
"Referring to the broad statutory language quoted in note 21 8upra, and discussed
at 24 aupra.
"See discussion at 24 eupra.
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